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The prior studies report that the global big4 audit firms (Big4) generally provide higher quality audit services 
compared to the local audit firms, but inconsistent result on audit quality of the Big4 audit firms was observed in the 
Chinese stock market. We believe that it may be not appropriate to distinguish high or low audit quality as separating 
the Big4 and non-Big4 because the market share of the Big4 and non-Big4 on Shanghai stock market is considerably 
lower than that of other countries. Therefore, we use the measure of Chinese big10 audit firms (Big10) as higher audit 
quality and examine the association with the level of earnings management using the sample of Shanghai Stock Market 
listed companies in China. From the empirical tests, we find that the Big10 provide better audit service to prevent 
their clients’ earnings management than non-Big10 audit firms. The finding of this study demonstrates the Big10 
provide differentiated audit service from non-Big10 audit firms on Shanghai stock market in China. 
 





ost audit studies suppose that the auditor size would be a relevant proxy of audit quality and they use 
a binominal variable of whether the company is audited by the international big4 audit firms (Big4) 
or not to investigate the influence of audit quality. By using the proxy of audit quality, many U.S. 
studies report that the Big4; PWC, KPMG, E&Y, and Deloitte, provide better quality of audit service than non-Big4 
(Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam, 1998; Campa, 2013; Choi, Kim, Kim & Zang, 2010; DeAngelo, 1981; 
Francis & Yu, 2009; Palmrose, 1989; Teoh & Wong, 1993). However, Chinese studies using the binominal variable 
of the Big4 provide mixed results in terms of audit quality (Feng & Zhou, 2007; Guo, 2011; Wang & Chen, 2006; 
Wang & Han, 2009; Wang & Yung, 2011; Wu, Zhang & Zhou, 2007; Zhang, Tian, Lv & Wang, 2014). Specifically, 
the prior studies did not present a consistent result of the Big4 providing better quality audit service than non-Big4 on 
Shanghai stock market in China.  
 
We consider that this is because the market shares between the Big4 and local audit firms in China stock market was 
different from other countries. In the global stock market, the Big4 mainly occupies the audit service market of large 
companies representing each country, while local accounting firms in each country are in charge of auditing small and 
medium-sized companies. However, in China, the government tried to steadily develop its local audit service firms. 
In response, the market share of the Big4 on Shanghai stock market is considerably lower than that of other countries. 
Thus, in this study, we suppose that it may be not appropriate to distinguish high or low audit quality as separating the 
Big4 and non-Big4 on Shanghai stock market in China.  
 
The Chinese government categorizes the size of audit firms by the ranks reported from the Chinese Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (CICPA). The CICPA has selected the top 100 accounting firms every year since 2003, 
with the top 10 accounting firms classified as big-sized audit firms, medium-sized audit firms from 11th to 200th, and 
the rest being small-sized audit firms. In this situation, rather than the existing distinction between the Big4 and non-
Big4, the distinction between the Chinese big10 audit firms (Big10) and non-Big10 audit firms is a better measure for 
M 
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audit quality in Shanghai stock market. Therefore, we predict that the earnings quality of firms audited by the Big10 
is higher than non-Big10. 
 
In order to examine that the Big10 provides audit service of higher quality than non-Big10 in terms of their clients’ 
level of earnings management, we collect 5,897 listed firm observations from 2009 to 2016 fiscal years in Shanghai 
stock market. From the empirical test, we find that there is a significantly negative association between the Big10 and 
the level of earnings management. This result indicates that the Big10 prevents their clients’ earnings management 
activity more effectively than non-Big10 audit firms. It can be interpreted that in countries with government support 
for local audit firms, the influence of the Big4 is not significant.  
 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence 
provided from prior studies about the audit quality of the Big10 to compare with non-Big10. We believe that our 
empirical evidence may shed a light on the understanding of the Big10 in Chinese stock market. Second, this study 
can provide insight into the unique market situation strongly influenced from the government and stress the importance 
of the auditor size in Shanghai stock market. 
 
PRIOR LITERATURES AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Prior studies reported that managers perform earnings management primarily for the purpose of enhancing their 
interests instead of stockholders’ wealth (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995; Rhee, Sloan & Sweeney, 2012; Rhee, 
Yoo & Cha, 2016). However, in the case of Chinese companies, they also have a more unique purpose in carrying out 
earnings management under socialist conditions (Liu & Lu, 2007; Zho, Choi & Yeom, 2013; Xu & Rhee, 2018). China 
is a socialist country and very distinct from capitalist countries. Chinese government can intervene more actively in 
its stock market than other capitalist government (Xu & Rhee, 2018). In this situation, Chinese companies are under 
high-level supervision from the Chinese government and need to maintain good relations with the government in order 
to run their business well. Zho et al. (2013) explain that Chinese listed companies are temporarily suspended in the 
event of a three-year consecutive loss in accordance with the China Securities Act. Thus, a company that has incurred 
a loss has an incentive to manage its earnings to maintain its listing qualification under the control of Chinese 
government. Liu and Lu (2007) also find that Chinese listed companies manage their earnings in order to avoiding 
delisting from the control of Chinese government. 
 
In audit literature, various measures are used to estimate audit quality, of which the most important proxies are auditor 
size, audit fee, and audit hours (Campa, 2013; Francis & Yu, 2009; Palmrose, 1986; Rhee et al., 2012). In terms of 
auditor size, prior U.S. studies generally explain that the Big4 provide a better-quality audit service (Caramanis & 
Lennox, 2008; Francis & Krishan, 1999; Piao & Kang, 2017). Francis and Krishnan (1999) argue that big auditors 
provide high quality audit services because they apply more conservative auditing standards to protect their reputation 
value. Therefore, the Big4 spend more audit hours and charge higher audit fees to clients because of the better-quality 
audit service (Piao & Kang, 2017). For this reason, the method of measuring audit quality by separating Big4 and non-
Big4 is generally used in the audit studies, 
 
Many U.S. audit studies report the consistent results that there is a significantly negative association between Big4 
and their clients’ level of earnings management. This means that the level of earnings management is reduced under 
the supervision of the Big4. Teoh and Wong (1993) analyze the difference from audit quality of big auditors and non-
big auditors using earnings response coefficient, and they find that the earnings response coefficient from big auditors 
is significantly higher than non-big auditors. Becker et al. (1998) explain that there is a difference in audit quality 
between big6 audit firms and non-big6 audit firms. They present the results that discretionary accruals are observed 
relatively low in companies audited by big6 auditors.  
 
However, Chinese studies about the effect of the Big4 on their clients’ earnings management reported mixed result. 
Wang and Chen (2006) find that discretionary accruals of the firms audited by Big4 auditors are lower than by non-
Big4 auditors. This result supports the argument that Big4 auditors provide the better quality of audit service. On the 
other hands, Wu et al. (2007) report that there is no difference about discretionary accruals of the firms audited by 
big-size audit firms and by small-size audit firms. They find that mid-size audit firms provide the significantly higher 
quality audit service than big or small-size audit firms. Feng and Zhou (2007), Wang and Han (2009), and Guo (2011) 
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investigate the effect of audit quality on firm’s earnings management using the proxy of discretionary accruals. 
However, they do not find the evidence that the Big4 is superior to mid or small-size audit firms in terms of audit 
quality.  
 
Audit firms in China must obtain permission from the Chinese government every year to carry out audit work, and 
the government selects separate audit firms that can take charge of audit work of listed companies every year. The 
Chinese government uses the ranking of the top 100 audit firms disclosed by the CICPA to categorize the size of audit 
firms. The CICPA has selected the top 100 accounting firms every year since 2003, with the top 10 accounting firms 
classified as big audit firms, medium-sized firms from 11th to 200th, and the rest being small-sized firms. Table 1 
presents the Big10 in 2016, and the size of audit firms was ranked by their business income instead of number of 
CPAs. Although big4 is included in Big10, it can be seen that the number of CPAs at local firms is relatively larger 
than that of Big4.  
 
 
Table 1. The Rank of Audit Firms in 2016 
Rank Audit Firms Business Income N. of CPAs 
1 PricewaterhousCoopers Zhong Tian 411,733.06 1,056 
2 Ruihua 403,014.91 2,514 
3 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Huaong 332,477.32 852 
4 BDO China Shu Lun Pan 350,168.60 1,939 
5 Ernst & Young Hua Ming 296,071.83 999 
6 KPMG Huazhen 253,335.25 741 
7 Pan-China 192,841.32 1,453 
8 ShineWing 156,075.17 1,289 
9 Baker Tilly China 152,274.80 943 
10 Da Hua 157,545.52 1,114 
(Unit: 10,000 Yuan, Person) 
Note: Released by CICPA on January 12th, 2017. The ranking is based on business income instead of the size of CPAs.  
 
 
In most prior studies about audit quality, the high and low audit quality was measured as audited by the Big4 and non-
Big4 audit firms (Becker et al., 1998; Campa, 2013; Choi et al., 2010; DeAngelo, 1981; Francis & Yu, 2009; Palmrose, 
1989; Teoh & Wong, 1993). But in China case, the size and market share of certain local audit firms are as high as 
the Big4 (Piao & Kang, 2017). Therefore, it is deemed more appropriate to use the binominal variable of Big10 and 
non-Big10 as measures to distinguish between high and low audit quality in Shanghai stock market. If the Big10 
provides audit services of higher quality than non-Big10, the level of the earnings management for the clients of the 
Big10 would be significantly lower than the non-Big10. To investigate the association between the audit quality from 
the Big10 and their clients’ level of earnings management, we set the following hypothesis.  
 





Measures Of Earnings Management 
 
In this study, we measure the level of earnings management for listed companies in Shanghai stock market using the 
modified Jones model below, commonly used in the study of earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995). In the 
model, TAi,t/Ai,t-1 from equation (1) is the total accruals and NDA from equation (2) is the estimated non-discretionary 
accruals. The difference between TAi,t/Ai,t-1 and NDA from equation (3) is the estimated discretionary accruals (DA). 
The DA implies the level of managers’ discretionary decision making in accounting process. In accounting study, 
absolute value of DA is commonly used as a proxy of the level of earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995; Kim, 
Yu & Kim, 2011; Jang & Park, 2015; Piao & Kang, 2017; Rhee et al., 2012). Therefore, we use the dependent variable 
of ABSDA as a proxy for level of earnings quality.  
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𝑇𝐴!,#/𝐴!,#$% = 𝛽%(1/𝐴!,#$%) + 𝛽&(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉!,#/𝐴!,#$%) + 𝛽'𝑃𝑃𝐸!,#/𝐴!,#$% + 𝜀 (1) 
 
𝑁𝐷𝐴!,# = 𝛽%(1/𝐴!,#$%) + 𝛽&(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉!,# − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶!,#)/𝐴!,#$% + 𝛽'𝑃𝑃𝐸!,#/𝐴!,#$% (2) 
 




𝑇𝐴!,#/𝐴!,#$%	=  total accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 
𝐴!,#$%  =  total assets at t-1; 
𝑁𝐷𝐴!,#  =  estimated non-discretionary accruals; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉!,#/𝐴!,#$%  =  revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 scaled by lagged total assets; 
𝑃𝑃𝐸!,#/𝐴!,#$%  =  property, plant, and equipment in year t scaled by lagged total assets; 




To test our hypothesis, we construct an indicator variable (BIG10) that equals to 1 if the audit firm is the Big10, 0 
otherwise. We set up the model by using the natural logarithmic value of audit fee which is the measure of the level 
of audit fee of audit firms and adding control variables which can affect management earnings based on prior studies 
(Jang & Park, 2015; Piao & Kang, 2017; Chun & Rhee, 2015) as follow. Table 2 provides the explanation of variables. 
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐷𝐴 = 𝛼( + 𝛼%𝐵𝐼𝐺10 + 𝛼&𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝛼'𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼)𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼*𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼+𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝛼,𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼-𝐶𝐹 
+𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 
 
 
Table 2. The Explanation of Variables 
Variables Explanation 
ABSDA Absolute value of DA, Level of earnings quality measured by the Jones model (1995). 
BIG10 An indicator variable that equals one when the audit firm is a Big10 and zero otherwise. 
FEE The natural logarithm of audit fees. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total asset. 
LEV Total liabilities scaled by total assets. 
ROA Return on assets. 
GROW Growth rate. 
LOSS An indicator variable that equals one when the company make a profit and zero otherwise. 
CF Net cash flow from operating activities. 
Year Dummy Year dummy variables. 





The empirical tests are based on 5,897 Chinese listed firm-year observations on the A-share market of the Shanghai 
stock market from 2009 to 2016. Our samples satisfy the following selection criteria: (1) Non-financial companies; 
(2) Financial information are available; (3) Auditor and audit fee information are provided. We collect the financial 
data from China Stock Market & Accounting Research database. We sort Big10 using the reports published by CICPA. 
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Table 3. Sample Distribution by Year 
Year Number of Observations Percentage (%) 
2009 460 7.80 
2010 703 11.92 
2011 782 13.26 
2012 795 13.48 
2013 804 13.63 
2014 817 13.85 
2015 770 13.06 
2016 766 13.00 
Total 5,897 100.00 
 
 
Table 4. Sample Distribution by Industry 
Industry N. of obs. Percentage (%) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery 89 1.51 
Mining 221 3.75 
Manufacturing 3,169 53.74 
Electricity and Gas 365 6.20 
Construction 219 3.71 
Transportation and storage industry 367 6.22 
Information transmission, Computer Services 220 3.73 
Wholesale and Retail 551 9.34 
Accommodation and Catering 22 0.37 
Real Estate 446 7.56 
Leasing 57 0.97 
Scientific Research and Geological Prospecting 24 0.41 
Water Conservancy and Environment 38 0.64 
Health and Society Welfare industry 12 0.20 
Culture and Entertainment industry 97 1.65 





Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics. The mean and standard deviation of ABSDA are 0.057 and 0.059 respectively. 
The average of BIG10 is 0.530 and this indicates that the Big10 account for about 53% of audit market share in 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
Variables Minimum Mean Maximum Std. Dev. N. of Obs. 
ABSDA 0.001 0.057 0.341 0.059 5,897 
BIG10 0.000 0.530 1.000 0.499 5,897 
FEE 12.429 13.729 16.475 0.763 5,897 
SIZE 19.370 22.474 26.382 1.374 5,897 
LEV 0.096 0.525 1.033 0.203 5,897 
ROA -0.199 0.032 0.185 0.053 5,897 
GROW -0.744 0.166 3.924 0.561 5,897 
LOSS 0.000 0.900 1.000 0.299 5,897 





Table 6 presents the Pearson correlations among the earnings management (ABSDA), the Big10, and other control 
variables. In this table, ABSDA is significantly and negatively correlated with BIG10. This implies that the level of 
earnings management is lower at the firms audited by the Big10 than at the firms audited by non-Big10 audit firms. 
This result of univariate analysis supports our hypothesis. However, the implication of the univariate results may be 
limited because the various factors are uncontrolled. Therefore, we run the multivariate regression to examine the 
association between earnings management and audit quality coupled with control variables next part.  
 
 
Table 6. Univariate correlations between variables 
 BIG10 FEE SIZE LEV ROA GROW LOSS CF 
ABSDA -0.083** -.0151** -0.183** 0.114** -0.140** 0.100** -0.161** -0.262** 
BIG10 - 0.297** 0.227** 0.024 0.024 -0.022 0.013 0.007 
FEE - - 0.769** 0.172** 0.068** 0.030* 0.086** 0.077** 
SIZE - - - 0.279** 0.090** 0.055** 0.147** 0.064** 
LEV - - - - -0.401** 0.048** -0.206** -0.182** 
ROA - - - - - 0.159** 0.640** 0.333** 
GROW - - - - - - 0.137** 0.020 
LOSS - - - - - - - 0.170** 





To carry out multivariate analysis, we need to verify that our empirical model is appropriate. Table 7 is the result of 
the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) test for autocorrelation in the residuals from our empirical model. The DW provides 
a value between 0 and 4, and the value of 2 indicates that there is no autocorrelation deleted in the model. If the value 
is between 0 to less than 2, it may have positive autocorrelation while if the value is between more than 2 to 4, it may 
have negative autocorrelation. In table 7, the DW test result gives a value of 1.994 which is very close to 2. Therefore, 
our empirical model follows a normal distribution and has a strong explanatory power as a whole.  
 
 
Table 7. Durbin-Watson Test Result 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
0.366 0.134 0.133 0.054552 1.994 
 
 
Table 8 is the result of ANOVA test. The F-value of 114.181 indicates that our empirical model is appropriate to 
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Table 8. F-test Result 
Model Sum of Squares Degree of Freedom Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 2.718 8 0.340 114.181 0.000 
Residual 17.522 5,888 0.003  
Total 20.241 5,896  
 
 
Table 9 presents the result of multivariate regression for testing hypothesis. This study examines the association 
between Big10 and clients’ level of earnings management. The first column in table 9 shows that big audit firms 
(BIG10) is negatively associated with clients’ level of earnings management at one percent or less of significance 
level (t-stat = -3.17). This negative association suggests that the level of earnings management is significantly reduced 
in the case of the Big10, indicating that the Big10 provides a higher audit service than non-Big10. We check the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) to examine whether multicollinearity problems have occurred. Since our maximum 
VIF is 2.704, which is smaller than the benchmark 10, it can be interpreted that there will be few multicollinearity 
problems in our empirical test. 
 
 
Table 9. Multivariate Test Result 
Independent variables Dependent variable: ABSDA Coefficient Adjusted t-value 
BIG10 -0.040** -3.17 
FEE 0.010 0.51 
SIZE -0.194** -9.72 
LEV 0.120** 8.38 
ROA 0.066** 3.72 
GROWTH 0.116** 9.34 
LOSS -0.127** -7.98 
CF -0.231** -17.84 
Year Dummy Included 
Industry Dummy Included 
Adjusted R2 0.133 
Max VIF 2.704 
Number of Observations 5,897 





This study examines the association between the Big10 and their clients’ level of earnings management in Chinese 
stock market. The audit service market in China provides a very unique research setting due to the socialist market 
situation. Mostly, the Big4 occupy the audit service market for major companies around the world, while each 
country's local accounting firm is primarily responsible for auditing small-sized or medium-sized companies. 
However, in China, the government tried to steadily develop its local audit firms. In response, the market share of the 
Big4 on Shanghai stock market is considerably lower than that of other countries. Thus, it may be not appropriate to 
distinguish high or low audit quality as separating the Big4 and non-Big4 audit firms on Shanghai stock market in 
China.  
 
The Chinese government categorizes with the top 10 accounting firms classified as big-sized audit firms, mid-sized 
audit firms from 11th to 200th, and the rest being small-sized audit firms. In this situation, the distinction between the 
Big10 and non-Big10 is a better measure for audit quality in China rather than the existing distinction between the 
Big4 and non-Big4. Therefore, in this study we suggest that the earnings quality of firms audited by the Big10 is better 
than of firms audited by non-Big10 audit firms. 
 
From the empirical test, we find that there is a significantly negative association between the Big10 and their client’s 
level of earnings management. This result indicates that the Big10 reduce the level of earnings management activity 
more effectively than non-Big10. This study, however, may have limitation under following caveats. First, there may 
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be other missing factors which bias our result. We eliminated several companies that provided incomplete data during 
the sample selection process, which could have some impact on the results of the study. Second, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that our result largely depend on measurement criteria or time period due to the nature of the empirical 
analysis. Therefore, it is challenging to say that our results can be generalized into a broader set of firms or time 
periods. 
 
Despite the limitation, this study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, there is 
no empirical evidence provided from prior studies about the audit quality of the Big10 to compare with non-Big10 
audit firms. We believe that our empirical evidence may shed a light on the understanding of the Big10 on Shanghai 
stock market in China. Second, this study can provide insight into the unique market situation strongly influenced 
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